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Apr. 9, 1953.J

LAURA E. DA.NIEI.,S et al., Appellants, v. CITY AND
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al., Respondents.
[1] Negligence-Last Clear Chance.-Whether or not the doctrine
of last clear chance applies in a particular case depends entirely on existence or nonexistence of elements necessary to
bring· it into play, and such question is controlled by factual
circumstances and must ordinarily be resolved by the factfinder.
[2] !d.-Instructions-Last Clear Chance.-An instructicn stating
the last clear chance doctrine is proper when there is evidence showing that plaintiff's negligence had placed him in
a position of danger from which he could not escape by the
exercise of ordinary care, and defendant had knowledge of
plaintiff's situation and had last clear chance to avoid the
accident by exercising ordinary care, but defendant failed
to exercise such care and the accident resulted which caused
plaintiff's injuries.
[3a-3c] Automobiles-Evidence-Last Clear Chance.-In action for
injuries resulting from an intersection collision of defendant's
bus with automobile driven by plaintiff, it cannot be said as
a matter of law that the evidence is insufficient to justify
application of last clear chance doctrine where there is evidPnce that plaintiff did not stop at an arterial stop sign before entering a six-lane highway, and came to a complete stop
only as she was crossing the highway's eastbound middle lane,
at which point Rhe first became aware of defendant's bus
traveling toward her in the inner eastbound lane and accelerated her car in an effort to escape from path of bus; that bus
driver saw plaintifi's car when it proceeded into highway, and
that he saw it "slowing up" until it came to a complete stop
directly in his path; that plaintiff and her guest first saw the
bus when it was 200 feet away and traveling in the middle
eastbound lane between 30 and 60 miles per hour, and that bus
[1 J Doc tine of last clear chance, notes, 92 A.L.R. 47; 119 A.L.R.
1041; 171 A.L.R. 365. See, also, Cal.Jur., Negligence, § 80; Am.
Jur., Negligence, § 215.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Negligence, § 46; [2] Negligence,
§ 217; [3] Automobiles, § 271; [4, 7] Automobiles, § 305; [5, 6]
Automobiles, § 152; [8, 9] Automobiles, § 352; [10] Trial, § 154;
[11] Appeal and Error, § 1714; [12] Appeal and Error, § 1471;
[13] Automobiles, § 275; [14] Automobiles, § 322-1; [15] Witnesses, § 93 (4); [16] Automobiles, § 350-1.
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[ 4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

dl'iver suddenly swung bus into inner lane when plaintiff's car
was but 50 feet ahead.
!d.-Province of Court and Jury-Last Clear Chance.-Where
automobile driven by plaintiff entered highway on which defPndant's bus was proceeding and slowed to a full stop in the
middle lane directly in the path of the approaching bus, it
is a .factual consideration for the jury whether or not such
procedure was sufficient to alert a reasonable man.
Id.--Last Clear Chance.-Applic:ability of last clear chance
doetTine to a vehicle collision case is not limited to where
defendant actually knew that an accident was inevitable if
he failed to exercise ordinary caTe, it being sufllcient if circumstances of which he had knowledge were such as to convey
to the mind of a reasonably prudent person a question as to
whether plaintiff would be able to escape a collision.
Id.-Last Clear Chance.-If defendant bus driver saw automobile driven by plaintiff enter highway on which bus was
proceeding and slow to a full stop in the middle lane directly
in the path of the bus, defendant may not avoid application
of last clear chance doctrine by asserting that plaintiff's automobile was not in a position of danger until it jumped forward from a standing position in the middle lane into the
path of the bus as its driver veered to the inside lane in
an attempt to avoid a collision.
!d.-Province of Court and Jury--Last Clear Chance.-Where
plaintiff suing for injuries resulting from an intersection collision of an automobile driven by her and defendant's bus
testi {iPd that she first saw tlw bus approaching in the six-lane
high way's east hound middle laue, estimating its speed at hetwePn 50 and 60 miles per hour, and that without any warning
OJ' signal of any kind to indicate an intent to change his course,
the bus driver suddenly swung into the inner lane as plaintiff's
car was but 50 feet ahead, resulting in the collision, whereas
defendant argued that plaintiff, having admittedly entered
the highway at the slow rate of 5 miles per hour, had the
better chance to a void the accident, and that having come to
a stop in the middle lane, she could have remained there
in a "place of safety" until the bus passed in front of her
ear via the inner lane, and that he could not anticipate that
she would "jump" her automobile ahead into the inner lane
when it was not possible for the bus to stop in time to avoid
a collision, it is ::1 question for the jury to determine whether
bus driver had a last clear ehanee to avoid tlw accident by
exercising ordinary care.
!d.-Instructions-Last Clear Chance.-In action for injuries
resulting from an intersection collision of defendant's bus
with automobile driven by plaintiff, instructions directed only
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to duty of bus driver to "use reasonable prudence in analyzing
the . . . situation" confronting him so as to avoid colliding
with the automobile do not include the elements of the last
clear chance doctrine.
[9] !d.-Instructions-Last Clear Chance.-Instructions in vehicle
collision case that any negligence on the part of plaintiff driver
or her guest would bar a recovery refute any application of
the last clear chance doctrine, since a necessary tenet of such
doctrine is the presence of plaintiff's negligence.
[10] Trial-Instructions-Theory of Case.-It is the duty of the
court to instruct on every theory of the case finding support
in the evidence.
[11] Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Verdict.-The ordinary rules on appeal sustaining a general verdict which the
evidence on one of several issues upholds have no application
where plaintiffs' theory of recovery was not even presented
to the jury as an issue affecting their right of recovery.
[12] !d.-Harmless and Reversible Error-Miscarriage of Justice.
- I f it cannot be said that, in the absence of error complained
of, a different verdict would have been improbable, the erroneous ruling constitutes a miscarriage of justice within the
meaning of Const., art. VI, § 4Yz.
[13] Automobiles-Province of Court and Jury-Speed.-Whether
a given area of a highway is a residence district with a 25mile limit (Veh. Code, § 511) is not a jury question, since
signposting is the sole criterion in view of the fact that the
code provision expressly pr,escribes a 55-mile limit "under all
conditions unless a different speed is established . . . and signs
are in place giving notice thereof."
[14] Id.-Instructions-Speed.-It is not error to instruct that
tl,le prima facie speed limit at the area of the highway where
a collision of vehicles occurred was 55 miles per hour, in
the absence of evidence that signposting established a lower
limit.
[15] Witnesses-Examination of Adverse Party-Effect of Testimony.-While testimony of witness called under Code Civ.
Proc., § 2055, as an "adverse witness" is to be disregarded insofar as unfavorable when considered on a motion for nonsuit or a directed verdict, such rule is not applicable when
the case is submitted on its merits, in which case such testimony is to receive the same consideration in determining the
facts as any other testimony.
[ 16] Automobiles-Instructions-Contributory Negligence-Guests.
-While ordinarily a guest is not charged with the responsibility of observing the condition of the traffic on highway,
where the evidence in a vehicle collision case shows that
plaintiff's guest did undertake to make such observation and
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that she actively participated with plaintiff in their joint
decision that the highway was "clear," it is proper to instruct
the jury with reference to whether such guest exercised reasonable care for her own safety.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco and from an order denying
a new trial. Edward .M:olkenbuhr, Judge. Judgment reversed;
appeal from order dismissed.
Action for damages for injuries resulting from an intersection collision of vehicles. Judgment for defendants reversed.
Tobriner & Lazarus and Leland J. Lazarus for Appellants.
Dion R. Holm, City Attorney, and George E. Eaglin, Deputy City Attorney, for Respondents.
SPENCE, J.-Plaintiffs sought to recover for personal injuries and property damage sustained as the result of an intersection collision between an automobile driven by plaintiff
Laura E. Daniels and a municipal bus operated by defendant
Myron Urdahl. The verdict was for defendants. From the
judgment thereupon entered and an order denying their motion for a new trial, plaintiffs have appealed. As the latter
order is nonappealable (Code Civ. Proc., § 963; 20 Cal.Jur.
213), the appeal therefrom must be dismissed.
The jury was given the customary instructions on the
issues of negligence and contributory negligence. However,
the court refused to instruct on the doctrine of last clear
chance. The propriety of such refusal is the principal point
in dispute. The form of the proposed instruction is not in
question. (B.A.,T.I. 205, p. 310; Root v. Pacific Greyhound
Lines, 84 Cal.App.2d 135, 137 [190 P.2d 48) ; Alberding v.
Pritchard, 97 Cal.App.2d 443, 444-445 [217 P .2d 1012].)
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the application of the doctrine and indulging every reasonable inference in support thereof (Bonebrake v. McCormick, 35 Cal.
2d 16, 19 [215 P.2d 728] ; Belinsky v. Olsen, 38 Cal.2d 102,
103 [237 P.2d 645] ; Hopkins v. Carter, 109 Cal.App.2d 912,
913 [241 P.2d 1063)), we have concluded that plaintiffs
were entitled to the requested instruction.
The accident occurred on March 5, 1949, about 5 :30 p. m.
at the intersection of Alemany Boulevard and Congdon Street
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in San Francisco. Alemany Boulevard, a six-lane signposted
"through highway" (Veh. Code, §§ 82.5, 552, 577), runs in
a general easterly-westerly direction. It is quite winding,
and long concrete "islands" divide the boulevard into two
three-lane roadways for opposite travel. Each roadway is
38 feet wide, with the outer lane 17 feet 6 inches wide, the
middle lane 10 feet wide, and the inner lane 10 feet 6 inches
wide. Congdon Street runs north-south and slopes a little
downhill as it ends at the boulevard. Mrs. Daniels was
driving her automobile in a northerly direction along Congdon
Street and approaching the boulevard intersection, which was
protected by an arterial stop sign. She intended to cross
the boulevard's eastbound lanes and turn to her left onto
the westbound roadway. The view of eastbound boulevard
traffic approaching from her left was partially obscured by
a large billboard on the southwest corner of the intersection
and the curving line of the boulevard. At that time defendants' gasoline-propelled bus was traveling easterly in
the boulevard's middle lane, having just made a stop at the
Mission Street viaduct, which crosses the boulevard 750 feet
west of Congdon Street. The driver, defendant Urdahl, then
had a fleeting view of plaintiffs' automobile as it proceeded
down Congdon Street and passed an opening between the
corner billboard and the last house on the street.
Meanwhile Mrs. Daniels drove slowly into the boulevard's
eastbound roadway and when defendant Urdahl next saw it,
it had stopped momentarily in the middle lane some 180 to
200 feet in front of the bus. At that point Mrf'l. Daniels
testified that she first saw the approaching bus, which she
estimated to be traveling at a speed between 50 and 60 miles
per hour. The bus driver testified to this sequence of events
as he saw plaintiffs' automobile ahead on the boulevard: that
he was then proceeding at the rate of 35 miles per hour ;
that he immediately applied his brakes for about 30 or 40
feet, slackening his speed to 15 or 20 miles an hour; that
he then released the brakes, accelerated the bus and steered
toward the inside lane in an effort to pass in front of plaintiffs' automobile; and that finally, when a collision seemed inevitable, he again applied his brakes. Mrs. Daniels testified
that upon seeing the bus to the left bearing down on her as
she was driving about 5 miles an hour, she accelerated her
speed in an attempt to complete her crossing of the boulevard's eastbound roadway and avert a collision. However,
the left front of the bus struck the left rear of her automo-
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bile just forward of its rear bumper, and spun it around so
that it came to rest in the boulevard's three-lane roadway for
westbound traffic. The last braking of the bus left 72 feet
of skid marks to the point of collision, and there were 24 feet
of "brush" marks made by the tires of plaintiffs' automobile while it was being pushed along the pavement. Mrs.
Daniels was thrown from her automobile by the impact and
injured. Mrs. Smith, who was riding beside her, was less
seriously hurt.
[1] Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance applies in a particular case depends entirely upon the existence
or nonexistence of the elements necessary to bring it into
play. Such question is controlled by factual circumstances
and must ordinarily be resolved by the fact-finder. (Girdner
v. Union Oil Co., 216 CaL 197, 199 [13 P.2d 915] ; Hopkins
v. Cm·ter, supra, 109 Cal.App.2d 912, 915.) [2] An instruction stating the doctrine is proper when there is evidence showing: " (1) 'fhat plaintiff has been negligent and, as
a result thereof, is in a position of danger from which he
cannot escape by the exercise of ordinary care; and this includes not only where it is physically impossible for him to
escape, but also in cases where he is totally unaware of his
danger and for that reason unable to escape; (2) that defendant has knowledge that the plaintiff is in such a situation, and knows, or in the exercise of ordinary care should
know, that plaintiff cannot escape from such situation; and
( 3) has the last clear chance to avoid the accident by exercising ordinary care, and fails to exercise the same, and the
accident results thereby, and plaintiff is injured as the proximate result of such failure." (Girdner v. Union Oil Co.,
supra, p. 202; also Belinsky v. Olsen, supra, 38 Cal.2d 102,
104; Peterson v. Burkhalter, 38 Ca1.2d 107, 109-110 [237 P.2d
977].)
[3a] The first clement is not lacking under the evidencethat plaintiff Laura Daniels by reason of her own negligence
found herself in a position of danger from which she could
not escape by the exercise of ordinary care. While there is
a conflict as to whether· plaintiffs' automobile stopped at the
arterial stop sign before entering the boulevard, the defense
witnesses agreed that Mrs. Daniels did not make the required
stop but merely "slowed down" her automobile as she approached the intersection, and that she came to a complete
stop only as she was crossing the boulevard's middle lane
for !:)a8tbound traffic. At that point she first became aware

620

DANIELS v. CITY & CouNTY

OF

SAN FRANCisco [40 C.2d

of defendants' bus as it was traveling toward her in the
center eastbound lane, and it was then that she accelerated
her automobile in an effort to escape from its path.
Nor is the evidence lacking· in support of the second
element, upon defendants' claim that there is no showing
that Urdahl, the bus driver, was aware of Mrs. Daniels' perilous situation or knew that she could not escape therefrom.
Urdahl testified that he first saw plaintiffs' automobile in the
brief interval when it passed between the corner billboard
and the last house on Congdon Street, and next when it proceeded into the boulevard. He kept his eyes on it and saw
it "slowing up" until it came to a complete stop directly in
his path in the boulevard's center lane. [4] He could not then
know what was the cause for the retardation of plaintiffs'
automobile as it rolled slowly into his lane of travel, and
whether or not such procedure was sufficient to alert a reasonable man was a factual consideration for the jury. [5] As
stated in Cady v. Sanford, 57 Cal.App. 218, 226 [207 P. 45] :
"It was not necessary that appellant should actually know
that an accident was inevitable if he failed to exercise care.
It is enough if the circumstances of which he had knowledge
were such as to convey to the mind of a reasonably prudent
man a question as to whether respondent would be able to
escape a collision.'' (Peterson v. Burkhalter, sttpra, 38 Cal.
2d 107, 111; see, also, Jones v. Yuma Motor F. Terminal Co.,
45 Cal.App.2d 497, 501-502 [114 P.2d 438]; Alberding v.
Pritchard, supra, 97 Cal.App.2d 443, 445.)
[6] Defendants argue that plaintiffs' automobile was not
in a "position of danger" until it "jumped forward" from
a standing position in the middle lane into the path of the
bus as Urdahl veered to the inside lane in an attempt to
avoid a collision. But such argument makes no allowance
for Urdahl 's admitted awareness of plaintiffs' automobile before it even stopped and while he saw it reducing its speed
as it came into his path. From this aspect of the evidence it
becomes unnecessary to consider decisions upon which defendants rely to the effect that the last clear chance doctrine
cannot apply until a position from which the plaintiff cannot escape danger has been reached. ( Yottng v. Southern Pac.
Co., 189 Cal. 746, 753 [210 P. 259] ; Rodabattgh v. Tekus, 39
Cal.2d 290, 294 [246 P.2d 663].) It would be a disregard
of the realities of the situation to hold that under no view
of the record could it be said that Urdahl 's obsPrvation of
the slackening speed of plaintiffs' automobile until it finally
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came to rest in his lane of travel on the 55-mile per hour highway might not reasonably constitute sufficient warning of the
imminently perilous position created in front of him. Such
consideration distinguishes cases where there was no evidence that would sustain a finding of knowledge by defendant of the plaintiff's dang·er. (Johnson v. Southwestern
Eng. Co., 41 Cal.App.2d 623, 628 [107 P.2d 417] .)
Likewise the recol'cl is not lacking in support of the
third dement of ihe doctrine bearing on Urdahl's possession
of the last clear ehaw~e to avoid the collision through the exerl:ise of onlinary care. Both Mrs. Daniels and Mrs. Smith
tesrified that when they first savY defendants' bus approaching
in tl1e boulevard's middle lane, it was about 200 feet to their
left. :Mrs. Daniels estimated its speed at between 50 and 60
miles per hour. Unlahl trstified that he was then traveling
about 35 miles per hour an(] that he saw plaintiffs' automobile
at the stated distaHec in front of him "slowing down" to a
"eomplete stop," at ,;,·hieh i ime he gave his bus 30 or 40 feet
of ''pretty heavy . . . braking'' so as to reduce his speed
to about 15 or 20 mil''" prr hour. Then he put his foot on
the gas throttle aml wl1en plaintiffs' automobile was still some
50 feet distant, l1e turned his bus toward the inner lane in
an effort to pas.~ in frollt of it but instead its left rear end was
caught by the btu;. Defendants argue that Mrs. Daniels admittedly entering into the boulevard at the slow rate of 5
miles per hour, rather than Urdahl driving the rapidly moving
bus, had the better chanee to avoid the accident; that traveling
at Pi miles per hour, she estimated that she could have stopped
within one foot, so that until she reached that distance from
the projected path of the bus she was only "approaching but
.. not aetnally in a position of danger" (Dalley v. Williams,
78 Cal.App.2d 427, 435 [166 P.2d 595]); that having come
to a stop in the boulevard's middle lane, she could have remained there in a "place of safety" until defendants' bus
passe(] in front of lJPr automobile via the inner lane (Gore v.
iJ1arket Street Ry.
4 Cal.2c1154, 157 [48 P.2d 2]); or she
could have accelerated the speed of her automobile sufficiently
to have cleared the path of the bus instead of being hit at the
left rear bumper ( cf. Young v. Southern Pac. Co., 182 Cal.
369, 380 [190 P. 36] ). Defendants further argue that having
come to a
Mrs. Daniels, to all appearances, was yielding
the right of way to Urdahl and inviting him to swing to the
left or inner lane in front of her; and that as he accordingly
changed his course, he could not anticipate that she would
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fJreate a second emergency by "jumping" her automobile
ahead into the inner lane, when it was not possible for the
bus to stop in time to avoid a collision. ( Ginwno v. Martin, 64
Cal.App. 154, 157 [220 P. 1076] .) To this point defendants
cite Vehicle Code, section 543, which provides: "No person
shall start a vehicle stopped . . . on a highway . . . unless
and until such movement can be made with reasonable.,;afety."
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend that their automobile was
not in a "place of safety" standing in the boulevard's middle
lane with defendants' bus 200 feet to the left and continuing
to travel directly ahead toward plaintiffs' automobile without
deviation ; that Urdahl 's partial braking so as to reduce the
speed of the bns to 15 or 20 miles per hour might reasonably
be construed as an invitation for Mrs. Daniels to accelerate
her automobile forward and escape from the perilous position
in the center lane, and that without warning or signal of
any kind to indicate his intent to change his course, Urdahl
stepped on the accelerator of the bus to swing into the inner
lane as plaintiffs' automobile was but 50 feet ahead, and the
two vehicles collided.
[7] In the light of these opposing factual considerations,
it was for the jury to determine whether Urdahl had a last
clear chance to avoid the accident by exercising ordinary
care. (Root v. Pac1:jic Greyhonnd Lines, s1~pra, 84 Cal.App.2d
135, 137; Bragg v. Smith, 87 Cal.App.2d 11, 14 [195 P.2d
546 J ; Hopkins v. Carter, supm, 109 Cal.App.2d 912, 916.)
There is no shovving in the record that the operation of either
vehicle was hindered by the presence of other automobiles in
the innnediate vicinity. The fact that it could be inferred
from the evidence that Urdahl should have foreseen that Mrs.
Daniels might proceed forward in response to his slowing
down his bus in the middle lane distinguishes such cases as
JYicHt~gh v. Market St. Ry. Co., 29 Cal.App.2d 737 [85 P.2d
467], and Jones v. Het·nr·ieh, 49 Cal.App.2d 702 [122 P.2d
804], relied on by defendants. Likewise not in point are cases
involving collisions between two fast-moving vehicles at a
street intersection (Poneino v. Reid-Mtwdock & Co., 136 Cal.
App. 228, 232 [28 P.2d 932] ; Dalley v. Williams, supra, 73
Cal.App.2d 427, 436; Allin v. Snavely, 100 Cal.App.2d 411,
415 [224 P.2d 113]) or between a fast-moving vehicle and a
train at a railroad crossing (Johnson v. Sacramento Northern
Ry., 54 Cal.App.2d 528, 532 [129 P.2d 503]) where the act
creating the peril occurs practically simultaneously with the
happening of the accident and in which neither party may be
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said to have had thereafter a last clear chance to avoid the
consequences. (Rodabaugh v. Tektcs, supra, 39 Cal.2d 290,
294-295.) The relative time, speed and distance factors in
the cases where the evidence was held insufficient as a matter
of law to permit the application of the doctrine were quite
rtifferent from those before us.
[3c] As the present record has been here reviewed, it
cannot be said as a matter of law that the evidence was insufficient to justify the application of the last clear chance
doetrine. Defendants submit that even though the court
erroneonflly refused to instruct on the last clear chance doctrine, nevertheless no prej ndice resulted to plaintiffs because
( 1) the doctrine was covered by other. instructions given by
the eonrt and (2) the general verdict of the jury imports
fimlings in favor of defendants on all material issues so as to
preelude plaintiffs from raising an objection based on that
theory of recovery. Neither point is well taken.
[8] The instructions cited by defendants in nowise purporter] to include the elements of the last clear chance doctrine. Rather they were directed only to the duty of the
bus drivrr to "use reasonable prudence in analyzing the . . .
situation'' confronting him so as to avoid colliding with plaintiffs' automobile. [9] Moreover, the court in its other instructions plainly refuied any application of the last clear
ehance doctrine by charging the jury that any negligence
on the part of either Mrs. Daniels or her guest, Mrs. Smith,
would bar a recovery, thoug·h a necessary tenet of the doctrine
is the presence of the plaintiff's negligence. (Girdner v. Union
Oil Co., supra, 216 Cal. 197, 201-204; Belinsky v. Olsen, supra,
38 Cal.2d 102, 105.) [10] It is the duty of the court to
instruct on every theory of the case finding support in the
evidence. (Emery v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 61 Cal.App.2d
455, 462-463 [143 P.2c1112]; Ji'e1·rnla v. Santa Fe Bus Lines,
83 CaLL\pp.2(1 416, 420 [189 P.2d 294]; Stickel v. Durfee, 88
Cal.App.2d 402, 406-407 [199 P.2d 16].) [11] The ordinar;· rules on appeal sustaining a general verdict which the
evidence on one of several issues upholds (2 CaLJur., § 612,
pp. 1028-1029; 24 CaLTur., § 134, p. 885) has no application
here where plaintiffs' theory of recovery was not even presented to the jury as an issue affecting their right of recovery.
(Bonebrake v. McCormick, supra., 35 Cal 16, 19; Belinsky
v. Olsen, supra, 38 Ca1.2d 102, 103.) [12] In determining,
from a consideration of the entire record, whether the error
prejudiced. plaintiffs' rights (Canst., art. VI, § 4lj2 ), the rule
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is no different from that applicable in a criminal case and
stated as follows : ''If it cannot be said that, in the absence
of the error complained of, a different verdict would have been
improbable, the erroneous ruling constitutes a miscarriage of
justice within the meaning of the constitutional provision.''
(People v. Newson, 37 Cal.2d 34, 45 [230 P.2d 618]; see, also,
People v. Hamilton, 33 Cal.2d 45, 51 [198 P.2d 873] .) It so
apppars here.
Certain other points raised by plaintiffs with regard to the
instructions will be briefly discussed.
[13] The first point is plaintiffs' attack upon the court's
charge that as a matter of law the prima facie speed limit
for defendants at the intersection in question was 55 miles per
hour, and that accordingly Mrs. Daniels, upon driving into
the boulevard, should exercise an amount of care commensurate
with such travel conditions. Plaintiffs argue that the jury
was thereby misinformed as to the authorized prima facie
speed limit and that whether the area was a residence district vvith a 25-mile limit (Veh. Code. § 511) "would be a jury
question and not one for judicial notice.'' But the sign posting
of a highway is absolutely essential for the application of
the lower prima facie speed limits. Section 511, after excepting certain types of areas where lower speed limits apply, expressly prescribes a 55-mile limit "under all conditions
unless a different speed is established as provided in this
code ancl signs aTe 1:n place g1:ving notice thereof." (Emphasis
added.) Accordingly, ''no area has the prima facie speed
limit of a . . . residence district unless it is sign posted.''
(Reynolds v. Pilomeo, 38 Cal.2d 5, 13 [236 P.2d 801] ;
GueTTa v. BTooks, 38 Cal.2d16, 19-20 [236 P.2d 807] .) [14] A
witness for defendants testified that a 25-mile sign was posted
for westbound Alemany traffic "right at the edge of the viaduct,'' which was ''about two or three blocks'' west of the
intersection, and that while not sure, he did not believe that
in the area in question there were any speed limit signs posted
for eastbound boulevard traffic. No other evidence was
addneed 'Nith regard to reduced speed limits under applicable
signs. Defendants introduced in evidence diagrams showing
that the boulevard lacked the requisite dwelling-house density
for a "residence district." (Veh. Code, §§ 90, 90.1.) Manifestly, the mentioned 25-milc sign "rig'ht at the edge of the
viaduct'' directed to westbound traffic marked the entrance of
boulevard traffic into a business or residence district extending
to the west thereof and had no relevancy to speed for travel
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eastward of it on either side of the boulevard. In such state
of the record the court did not err in giving the challenged
instruction.
[15] The seeond point is plaintiffs' eontention that the
eourt gave an erroneous and misleading instruetion on the
effect of seetion 2055, Code of Civil Procedure. Defendant
Urdahl was ealled by plaintiffs as an ''adverse witness'' and
questioned at some length. In this regard the eourt eharged:
''I instruet you that testimony given under seetion 2055
. . . is just as mueh evidenee in the ease as any other testimony properly reeeived. Sueh testimony is to reeeive the
same eonsideration from the jury in determining the facts
as any other testimony. Sueh testimony, if believed by the
jury and if otherwise suffieient, will sustain a verdiet against
the plaintiffs in this ease.'' Plaintiffs maintain that ''the
instruction should have explained that any sueh testimony
elieited by the plaintiffs should weigh for them insofar as
it was favorable, but that it should be disregarded insofar
as it was ttnfavorable, if the matters to which it referred were
not satisfaetorily established by other evidenee." (Emphasis
added.) But plaintiffs are relying upon authorities involving
rulings upon a motion either for a nonsuit (Marchetti v.
Southern Pac. Co., 204 Cal. 679, 686 [269 P. 529]; Dempsey
v. Star House Movers, Inc., 2 Cal.App.2d 720, 722 [38 P.2d
825]) or for a dirceted verdict (Smellie v. Sottthent Pac. Co.,
212 Cal. 540, 556 [299 P. 529]; People v. Mahoney, 13 Cal.
2d 729, 736 [91 P.2d 10291 ). 'l'he rules therein stated have
no application upon submission of the ease for a determination of the factual issues on the merits. (F'igari v. Olcese,
184 Cal. 775, 782 [195 P. 425, 15 A.L.R. 192]; Darn v.
P1"chinino, 105 Cal.App.2d 796, 800 [234 P.2d 307].) Thr
distinction is noted in the Smellie case, where, after a full
discussion, it is stated that testimony elicited under section
2055 ''is, of course, evidence in the case and may be considered in determining the issues of the case upon the trial
or final hearing by the court. or if the case is before a jury,
by the jury." (212 Cal. 559; see, also, Green v. Newmark,
136 Cal.App. 32, 37-38 [28 P.2d 395]; Balasco v. Chick, 84
Cal.App.2d 802, 808 [192 P.2d 76].) Since this case was
submitted to the jury on. the merits, the assailed instruction
was proper. (Joseph v. Vogt, 35 Cal.App.2d 439, 441 r95 P.2d
947]; Cloud v. Market Street Ry. Co., 74 Cal.App.2d 92, 96
[168 P.2d 191].)
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[16] The final point is plaintiffs' contention that since
there "was not the slightest evidence . . . upon which to base
a finding of contributory negligence on the part of [plaintiffl
Kathaleen Smith,'' the instruction submitting that issue as
to her was contrary to both the law and the evidence. They
cite as particularly objectionable the following charge: "If
you find that the plaintiff Kathaleen Smith did not look carefully for traffic eastbound on Alemany Boulevard, and that
she told JVIrs. Daniels that Alemany Boulevard looked clear
when in fact the bus was approaching so closely as to constitute an innm•diate hazard, the plaintiff Kathaleen Smith
was in such case guilty of negligence.'' But the quoted instruction does not appear to have been improper in view of the
record.
As the guest of lVIrs. Daniels, lVIrs. Smith could only be
chargeable with negligence by reason of her own conduct
rather than that of JVIrs. Daniels. lVIrs. Smith testified that
as plaintiffs' automobile came to a stop at the boulevard
intersection, she "glanced both ways" for traffic, that she
"saw nothing coming," and that she agr~ed with Mrs. Daniels
when the latter said that ''it all looked clear and we might
just as well go across." The record also shows that at the
intersection a billboard obstructed the view looking to the
left down the boulevard for eastbound traffic, so that defendants' bus did not come into the range of vision of Mrs.
Daniels and Mrs. Smith until after the former started to
drive acros!S the boulevard. While ordinarily ''a guest''
is "not charged with the responsibility for observing
the condition of the traffic upon the highway" (Murphy v.
National Ice Crearn Co., 114 Cal.App. 482, 489 [300 P. 91];
see, also, 1~1artinelli v. Poley, 210 Cal. 450, 458 [292 P. 451]),
plaintiffs' evidence here shows that Mrs. Smith did undertake
to make such observation and that she actively participated
with Mrs. Daniels in their joint decision that the boulevard
"wa;;; clear." ·under these circumstances the quoted instruction properly stated considerations affecting the jury's determination of whether Mrs. Smith exercised "reasonable care
for rher] own safety." (Miller v. Peter·s, 37 Cal.2d 89, 94
[230 P.2d 803] .)
In view of the above discussion relative to the applicability
of the last clear chance doctrine in the determination of this
case and the court's refusal to instruct thereon, plaintiffs are
entitled to a retrial.
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'l'he appeal from the order denying the motion for a
trial is dismissed. The judgment iR reversed.

J1(n\

Gibson, C. J., Shenk, ,J., and 1'raynor, J., concurred.
Edmonds, ,J ., dissented.
OAR1'ER, J .-I concur in the judgment of reversal because
I think it is obvious that reasonable minds might differ on
whether or not defendant had a last clear chance to avoid
the accident here involved. This is the one and only test
which may be applied in determining whether a case comes
within the last clear chance doctrine. There was a conflict in the evidence and the trier of fact might well have
found that plaintiff Daniels was negligent in placing herself
and Mrs. Smith in a position of peril which was perceived
by defendant in time to avoid a collision if he had exercised
ordinary care; that plaintiff was unable, by the exercise of
ordinary care, to extricate herself and Mrs. Smith from such
peril; and that defendant's failure to exercise ordinary care
was therefore the proximate cause of the accident. 'l'he facts
as disclosed by the record justify but do not compel this
conclusion.
The last clear chance doctrine has been applied in numerous
cases by the courts of this state. .As a legal theory it is well
understood by the legal profession. It is in the application
of the doctrine to a particular case where conflicts arise. (See
excellent article by Myron L. Garon, member of Los .Angeles
Bar, entitled Recent Developments in California's Last Clear
Chance Doctrine, volume 40, Cal.L.Rev., pp. 40"1-411.) There
ean be no doubt that the doctrine has been manna for injured
plaintiffs who have themselves been negligent. In my opinion
it is a salutary doctrine evolved by great liberal-minded
jurists to ameliorate the injustice whieh resulted from a rigid
application of the plea of contributory negligence as a eomplete defense in an aetion for personal injuries. I.1ike a11
other liberal doctrines it has met with opposition. Those
opposed have generally rejected it as inapplicable to the factual situation presented in a particular case-holding the
doetrine inapplicable as a matter of law. 'l'his eonclusion
being reached regardless of whether reasonable minds might
differ as to the factual situation presented. Such cases as
Yonng v. Smdhern Pac. Co., 182 Cal. 369 [190 P. 36]; Rodabattgh v. Tektts, 39 Cal.2d 290 [246 P.2d 663] ; Johnson v.

628

DANIE<LS v. CrrY & CouNTY oF SAN FRANCisco [40 C.2d

Southwestern Eng. Co., 41 Cal.App.2d 623 [107 P.2d 417];
Dalley Y. Williams, 73 Cal.App.2d 427 [166 P.2d 595] ; Gore
Y. klarket Street Ry. Co., 4 Cal.2d 154 [48 P.2d 2] ; and
Johnson v. Sacramento Northcr·n Ry., 54 Cal.App.2d 528 [129
P.2d 503] fall in this category.
There are, of course, many cases in which the doctrine is
inapplicable. There are also borderline cases. The problem
is first for the trial court to determine. If it submits the
issue to the jury on proper instructions and the jury finds
liability, I do not think it can then be said that reasonable
minds cannot differ as to the applicability of the doctrine,
because, to so hold, is to say that the trial judge and members
of the jury do not have reasonable minds. If the trial judge
refuses to submit the issue to the jury, the same situation
arises as when a nonsuit, directed verdict or motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is granted. The question for
the appellate court to determine in such a case is whether
there was any substantial evidence in the record on which a
trier of fact could reach a contrary conclusion. Of course,
if the appellate court holds that such evidence exists, the
reasonable minds doctrine comes into play and the case goes
back to the trial court where the issues of fact are determined.
'fhis is and should be the law, because it is the product of
reason, logic and common sense. If it were applied by the
courts of this state, it would remove a tremendous burden
from this court and the District Courts of Appeal as well
as our superior courts. 'fhis is manifest when we consider
that many of the cases now before this court and the District
Courts of Appeal involve only factual questions which have
been determined by the trial courts and the question we are
asked to decide is whether the issues of fact were correctly
determined. 'fhis is not the function of this court or of the
District Courts of Appeal, and if the members of this court
would come to this realization, we would have more time to
consider questions of law and dispose of cases more expeditiously. To demonstrate the truth of the foregoing statement,
I wish to call attention to the fact that we now have twelve
cases pending before this court which involve only factual
questions. Most of these cases, including the case at bar, were
correctly decided by the District Court of Appeal (see Daniels
v. C1:ty & County of San Francisco, *(Cal.App.) 246 P.2d
125, but these cases are before this court because a hearing
-• A hearing was granted by the Supreme Court on Sept. 11, 1952.
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was granted for the sole purpose of reconsidering questions
of fact. I shall have more to say on this subject when the
decisions in these cases are announced.
I also disagree with that part of the majority opinion
which holds that the trial court properly submitted to the
jury the issue of contributory negligence on the part of
Kathaleen Smith. The uncontradicted evidence shows that
Mrs. Smith was a guest in defendant Daniels' automobile,
had no control over its operation and there is no basis whatsoever for an inference that any negligence on her part in
anywise contributed to the accident. In this respect I am in
full accord with the views expressed by the District Court of
Appeal in its decision, supra, on this subject.
SCHAUER, ,T., Dissenting.-! would affirm the judgment.
Here again, in my opinion, is a case in which application
of the last clear chance doctrine has been extended past
reasonable bounds and the doctrine has become not one of
last clear chance but one of last possible chance. (See Peterson v. Bur·khalter (1951), 38 Cal.2d 107 [237 P.2d 977], and
my dissent at page 114; Rodabaugh v. Tekus (1952), 39 Cal.
2d 290 [246 P.2d 668], and my concurrence at page 297.)
Viewing the evidence most favorable to the application
of the last clear chance doctrine, there is here a plaintiff
who, having negligently placed herself in a position of peril
(she disregarded the defendants' arterial right of way, drove
at 5 miles an hour into the path of the bus, stopped, and
then started up again, slovvly), endeavors to escape therefrom
and a defendant who is charged with negligence in failing to
anticipate correctly, within a matter of seconds or fractions
of seconds, what course plaintiff will take in the endeavor
to escape the position of peril. Plaintiff was driving a relatively light and maneuverable automobile; defendant driver
was operating a heavy and unwieldy bus. If plaintiff had
either remained standing in the middle lane or had started her
slow progress forward from such middle lane to the inner lane,
then at once halted, and the bus had followed the course which
it actually did follow, the collision would have been avoided.
If plaintiff had progressed a little more rapidly the collision
would have been avoided. If the bus driver had. elected to
take the o11ter lane the collision would have been avoided. To
state that the bus driver, required to make such rapid
and nice anticipations of plaintiff'R possiblr conduct and
such nice calculations of what his own conduct should be,
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and to translate his conduct into control of the heavy and
rapidly moving bus, had a clear chance to avoid the accident
is, in my opinion, unrealistic and inaccurate. Where, as here,
plaintiff has at least as much chance to avoid a collision as
does defendant, I find no field for application of the last clear
chance doctrine.
Decisions of this kind suggest a need for legislative study
of the several facets of the problems involved. In this state,
what is the annual toll of, and loss from, traffic accidents not
indnstrially incurred? Can our society devise a better method
for protecting or compensating the injured and their families
than the common law tort action? If so, who should bear
the primary burden of such protection? How far should it
be spread'? And in what forum enforced?
rrhe above are but queries for future solution. The judgment here, on the present recognized concepts of law, should
be affirmed.
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied May 7,
1953. Edmonds. J., and Schauer, J., were of the opinion
that the petition should be granted.

[L. A. No. 22524.

In Bank.

Apr. 9, 1953.]

·ALBERT J. SILLS, Appellant, v. LOS ANGELES
TRANSIT LINES (a Corporation) et al., Respondents.
[1] Trial-Instructions-Theory of Case.-Each party is entitled
to have his theory of the case submitted to the jury in accordance with the pleadings and proof, and it is incumbent on
the trial court to instruct on all vital issues involved.
[2] Street Railways-Injuries from Operation-Questions of Law
and Fact.-Where plaintiff suing for injuries sustained as
result of collision of his automobile and defendant's streetcar
testified that the streetcar was four blocks away as he stopped
on the track and remained there 25 to 30 seconds prior to
[1] See Cal.Jur., Trial, § 92; Am.Jur., Trial, § 626.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Trial, § 154; [2] Street Railways,
§107(1); [3] Negligence, §29; [4] Street Railways, §107(5);
[5] Street Railways, § 107(7); [6] Negligence, § 48(3); [7] Street
Railways, § 102(8); [8, 9] Negligence, § 218; [10] Street Railways, § 127(8).

